Security: Document the hardening and the proxy's part in it

README: limit_req in the nginx sample, what HTTPS and TRUST_PROXY are
for, and the auth notes cover the throttles, Sec-Fetch-Site, headers
and logging. AGENTS.md records what the security pass checked and
left alone, so the next one need not repeat it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Sd8UPWrvyYCLj97JexNw3A

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index 5ffd8ba..5aec663 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -154,7 +154,11 @@ internal/web/         server.go (host router, middleware, render helpers)
   as well as to `reservedPageSlugs`) also get `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and
   a CSP of `frame-ancestors`/`base-uri`/`form-action`/`object-src` only —
   no `script-src`, the dashboard's inline scripts are a product
-  constraint. Public blog pages carry no framing rule (owner content). Flood
+  constraint. Public blog pages carry no framing rule (owner content).
+  Audited and left as is (2026-09): SQL is all parameterised (`likeEscape`
+  for ILIKE, `pgx.Identifier` for database names); templates are
+  `html/template` and the only `{{html}}` sinks are owner-authored content;
+  `/media` never renders a type a browser would script (`filetype.go`). Flood
   control for everything else stays at the reverse proxy (`limit_req`).
 - **Templates**: each page file is parsed together with its layout
   (`layouts/dashboard.html` or `layouts/blog.html` for `blog/*`) and all