From f8d90e3d80ec798689be5fdf792e6c1401ad748f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: grm <grm@eyesin.space>
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2026 13:46:11 +0300
Subject: Security: Throttle login attempts with a per-address, per-account
 token bucket

Nothing stopped a bot from trying passwords against /webadmin as fast
as bcrypt would go. A small in-memory limiter (stdlib only, one
process) now refuses a login with 429 once an address, or an account,
has made ten attempts, and lets one more through every six seconds;
keying on both means many addresses guessing one account are throttled
too. Refusals are logged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Sd8UPWrvyYCLj97JexNw3A
---
 internal/web/ratelimit.go | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 internal/web/ratelimit.go

(limited to 'internal/web/ratelimit.go')

diff --git a/internal/web/ratelimit.go b/internal/web/ratelimit.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b019a4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/web/ratelimit.go
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+package web
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// limiter is a token bucket per key (a client address, a username) for the
+// few anonymous endpoints worth abusing: login guesses and the search's
+// regex scan. Everything else is left to the reverse proxy's limit_req. It
+// lives in memory — one process, no shared state needed — and forgets a key
+// once its bucket has been full for a while.
+type limiter struct {
+	mu        sync.Mutex
+	rate      float64 // tokens per second
+	burst     float64
+	buckets   map[string]*bucket
+	lastSweep time.Time
+	now       func() time.Time // tests replace it
+}
+
+type bucket struct {
+	tokens float64
+	at     time.Time
+}
+
+const limiterSweep = 10 * time.Minute
+
+func newLimiter(perMinute, burst int) *limiter {
+	return &limiter{rate: float64(perMinute) / 60, burst: float64(burst), buckets: map[string]*bucket{}, now: time.Now}
+}
+
+// allow takes one token for key and says whether there was one.
+func (l *limiter) allow(key string) bool {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+	now := l.now()
+	if l.lastSweep.IsZero() {
+		l.lastSweep = now
+	} else if now.Sub(l.lastSweep) > limiterSweep {
+		l.lastSweep = now
+		for k, b := range l.buckets {
+			if l.fill(b, now) >= l.burst {
+				delete(l.buckets, k)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	b, ok := l.buckets[key]
+	if !ok {
+		b = &bucket{tokens: l.burst, at: now}
+		l.buckets[key] = b
+	}
+	if l.fill(b, now) < 1 {
+		return false
+	}
+	b.tokens--
+	return true
+}
+
+// fill credits the time since the last visit and returns the balance.
+func (l *limiter) fill(b *bucket, now time.Time) float64 {
+	b.tokens = min(l.burst, b.tokens+now.Sub(b.at).Seconds()*l.rate)
+	b.at = now
+	return b.tokens
+}
+
+// clientIP is the address requests are throttled by: the peer's.
+func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
+	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return r.RemoteAddr
+	}
+	return host
+}
+
+// throttle answers 429 and logs when key has no tokens left; false means the
+// request was refused.
+func (s *Server) throttle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, l *limiter, key string) bool {
+	if l.allow(key) {
+		return true
+	}
+	logf("throttled %s %s from %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path, clientIP(r))
+	s.fail(w, r, http.StatusTooManyRequests, s.tr(r, "Too many requests. Try again in a minute."))
+	return false
+}
-- 
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